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NOTE
WOULD A CORPORATE “DEATH PENALTY” BE
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT?
Drew Isler Grossman*
The longstanding legal fiction that corporations are “people” has
faced constant criticism since the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens
United.  As corporations gained the right to spend freely on elections
and exempt themselves from laws on religious grounds, many asked why
this fiction is necessary, and proposed constitutional amendments to
change these results.  For its part, the Supreme Court has never issued a
clear explanation of when and why this legal fiction should apply, often
unsure which rights are “personal,” which are “universal,” and whether
this distinction should matter.
This Note attempts to make sense of this expanding area of law us-
ing a question at the farthest reaches of the rights of a corporate “per-
son.”  Would the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment bar a “corporate death penalty”—the revocation of a corpo-
ration’s charter?  Using recent cases and scholarship on the death pen-
alty and corporate personhood, this Note argues that the Eighth
Amendment could bar such a penalty, but no more so than for a human;
even treating a corporation as a person, so long as the crime the corpo-
ration committed was sufficiently serious, its dissolution would not be
cruel and unusual punishment.  In answering this question, this Note
challenges the assertion that “fixing” this fiction would cure the per-
ceived ills of Citizens United, Hobby Lobby, and other corporate rights
cases, and asks whether the headline-grabbing statement that “corpora-
tions are people” is useful discourse or merely a distraction.
* B.A., Cornell University, 2011; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2016; Articles Editor,
Cornell Law Review, Volume 101.  Thank you to Scott McGill for the inspiration for this
Note; Professors Charles K. Whitehead and Michael C. Dorf for their guidance; and Lisa
Grossman, Mitch Grossman, and Christa Maiorano for their edits and expertise.  My thanks
also to L. Alyssa Chen, Sarah Ryu, Wayne Yu, and Jeffrey Ng for their contributions.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporations, as one British scholar famously put it, have “neither
bodies to be punished, nor souls to be condemned.”1  They are not things
of flesh and blood, but of contract, a series of agreements between people
who join together for a common purpose.  When compared to something
that breathes, speaks, moves, and thinks independent of any other force,
to say a corporation is not a person is trivial.
Nevertheless, it is useful in many legal contexts to treat corporations
as persons.  This fiction allows corporations to hold property, sue and be
sued in their own name, and hold a residency for procedural jurisdiction
purposes.2  It also explains why a person retains limited liability for their
corporation’s actions: the corporate person is legally separate from the
natural person, and carries its own assets and liabilities.  But this fiction
creates unexpected results when courts extend it beyond these traditional
areas, especially when interpreting constitutional and statutory rights.
Two recent Supreme Court cases—one extending the right to spend
1 Edward Thurlow, First Baron Thurlow, in JOHN POYNDER, LITERARY EXTRACTS FROM
ENGLISH AND OTHER WORKS 268 (1844), https://openlibrary.org/books/OL7104074M/Literary
_extracts_from_English_and_other_works.
2 See Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fic-
tion, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563, 590 (1987).
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money on corporate speech with abandon to corporations, the other per-
mitting them to claim religious exemptions to laws under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)—highlighted these unexpected re-
sults.3  These cases created widespread anger and confusion in many cir-
cles, as well as calls for a constitutional amendment to correct their
results.4
For its part, the Supreme Court’s explanations of when and why the
law should treat a corporation as a person are inconsistent and somewhat
unsatisfactory.  It has addressed Bill of Rights5 protections in a piece-
meal fashion, unsure what rights are “personal,” what rights are “univer-
sal,” and whether the distinction should matter.6  In the twenty-first
century, a majority of justices have favored a liberal interpretation: they
believe that, as far as Bill of Rights protections are concerned, courts
may treat persons and corporations the same.7  This choice, counterintui-
tive and one of a number of options available,8 leads to more questions
about this expanding area of constitutional law.
For example, to what extent does the Eighth Amendment prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment protect corporations?9  While
most scholarship addressing this question focuses on the Excessive Fines
Clause and whether a fine large enough to constitute a death penalty for a
corporation would be constitutional,10 a state or the federal government
3 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 348 (2010) (finding that the First Amend-
ment forbids restrictions on political speech “based on the speaker’s corporate identity”);
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (finding, based on the
Dictionary Act and other precedent, that corporations are persons for purposes of RFRA).
4 See Frequently Asked Questions, MOVE TO AMEND, https://movetoamend.org/frequent
ly-asked-questions (last visited Dec. 29, 2014); Aaron Wysocki, 28th Amendment, WOLF-PAC
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.wolf-pac.com/28th; S.J. Res. 4, 114th Cong. (2015) (constitutional
amendment proposed by Senator and 2016 presidential candidate Bernie Sanders that declares:
“Whereas the right to vote in public elections belongs only to natural persons as citizens of the
United States, so shall the ability to make contributions and expenditures to influence the
outcome of public elections belong only to natural persons.”).
5 U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
6 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (noting
a distinction between “purely personal” guarantees that should not apply to corporations, such
as protections against self-incrimination, and other protections that should). But see Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 357–58 (noting that the dictum in Bellotti was not well supported).
7 See, e.g., Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (“The court does
not wish to hear argument on the question whether [equal protection rights] appl[y] to these
corporations.  We are all of the opinion that it does.”). But compare Marshall v. Barlow’s,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978) (holding that corporations deserve Fourth Amendment protec-
tions against unreasonable search and seizure), with United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S.
632, 650–52 (1950) (holding that corporations get less privacy protection than natural
persons).
8 See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 914–31 (2011).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
10 See Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the
Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 834 (2013); Gabriel Markoff, Arthur
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could put a corporation to death in another way: by revoking its char-
ter.11  If a state or the federal government attempted to revoke a corpo-
rate charter for corporate criminal actions and a corporation claimed this
action violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment, what would happen?
This Note will attempt to answer that question using recent cases
and scholarship on the death penalty and corporate personhood.  Part I
examines the Court’s interpretation of corporate personhood under the
Bill of Rights, and how it evolved as the nature of corporations changed.
Part II discusses the Court’s cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence
as it applies to natural persons, as well as theories of “killing” a corpora-
tion.  Part III imagines a hearing in which a corporation attempted to
challenge its proposed dissolution under the protections of the Eighth
Amendment, and how the Supreme Court would likely address such an
argument.  The Note concludes by addressing the implications of this
result.
As this Note will demonstrate, no theory would support granting a
corporation unlimited protection against cruel and unusual punishment; it
could claim no more protection against a punishment than the individuals
comprising the corporation could claim.  The Supreme Court currently
permits the death penalty for humans provided the punishment fits pro-
portionately to the crime.  Thus, so long as the crime the corporation
commits is sufficiently serious, a corporate death penalty would not be
cruel and unusual.  This leads to an important question: does it matter if
corporations and the persons that comprise them enjoy the same protec-
tions under the Bill of Rights?  Or should those that disagree with the
result of these recent cases focus their efforts on other aspects of the
opinions?
I. THE RIGHTS OF CORPORATIONS
A. Corporate Personhood
Broadly, courts in America have considered corporate identity using
three distinct theories: artificial entity (corporations are creatures of the
state and may be regulated freely by the state), real entity (i.e. it actually
exists, separate from its owners or any other power), and aggregation
theory (corporations are the aggregate will and endeavor of individu-
Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in
the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797, 805–06 (2013).
11 For one proposal of a potential corporate death penalty statute, see Mary Kreiner Ra-
mirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing the Machine Through
the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 972–1001 (2005).
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als).12  Not surprisingly, each of these theories rose and fell in popularity
as corporations’ status under state law changed.
1. Artificial Entity Theory
From the United States’ founding to the mid-nineteenth century,
governments granted corporations charters for a specific purpose and
limited period.  Early corporations included universities,13 banks,
churches, and other entities that served a public function.14  Even some
early colonial settlements, such as the commonwealth of Virginia, began
as corporations chartered by the King of England to colonize the land in
his name.15  Because a state granted these corporations its authority (and
often its resources) for specific public purposes, any rights the corpora-
tion carried came from that state.  Governments could freely regulate this
artificial entity they created for a specific purpose; Bill of Rights protec-
tions simply did not apply.16
The key case from this era is Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, in which Chief Justice Marshall discussed the natural traits
of corporations as they were in 1819.17  Marshall called a corporation
“an artificial being . . . existing only in contemplation of law.  Being the
mere creatures of law, it possesses only those properties which the char-
ter of its creation confers upon it.”18  In that case, New Hampshire
wanted to dissolve Dartmouth College’s corporate charter and recreate it
as a public school.19  After the description above, Marshall decided that
the charter guaranteed the college’s trustees certain powers and privi-
12 See Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court’s
Campaign Finance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831, 835–43 (2013).  Padfield also describes
two further theories of corporations: entity (“[a] corporation is a separate legal entity that
can . . . sue and be sued”) and contract (“[a] corporate charter represents a contract between the
state and incorporators”). Id. at 836.  Neither theory is particularly useful in identifying corpo-
rate Bill of Rights protections, and (as Padfield acknowledges) neither was relevant to Citizens
United. Id. at 835.
13 Such as New Hampshire’s Dartmouth College. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Wood-
ward, 17 U.S. 518, 518 (1819), discussed infra notes 17–21.
14 See Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Com-
merce, 94th Cong. 3 (1976) [hereinafter Corporate Rights and Responsibilities] (statement of
John A. Durkin, Senator, New Hampshire) (“[B]ack in 1790 . . . corporations were chartered to
perform essentially public activities, to build roads, canals, and bridges.”); see also THOM
HARTMAN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: THE RISE OF CORPORATE DOMINANCE AND THE THEFT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 75–76 (2002) (listing types of nineteenth century regulations on corporations).
15 See FRANKLIN K. VAN ZANDT, BOUNDARIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SEVERAL
STATES (1966), http://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/0909/report.pdf.
16 See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITU-
TION, at ix (1995).
17 Woodward, 17 U.S. at 636–40.
18 Id. at 636.
19 Id. at 626–27.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-3\CJP304.txt unknown Seq: 6  7-JUN-16 16:38
702 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25:697
leges beyond the government’s general control.20  Because the King of
England (and not the state of New Hampshire) granted the college its
charter and the charter contained no provision allowing a state legislature
to revoke it, Marshall concluded that the legislature lacked the power to
do so.21  Thus, even in this era where the courts acknowledged that states
alone granted corporate rights, a legislature’s power to regulate corpora-
tions faced certain limitations.22
Another contemporary example is Paul v. Virginia,23 in which an
insurance company challenged a Virginia law preventing non-Virginia
companies from doing business within the state without a license.24  The
Supreme Court stated explicitly that corporations were not citizens enti-
tled to protection under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.25  It held that, as a corporation is a creature of
“local law” and has “no absolute right of recognition in other States,”
Virginia’s restrictions on out-of-state insurance companies did not vio-
late the Bill of Rights.26
2. Real Entity Theory
Yet as chartering laws and corporations evolved, the way courts an-
alyzed corporate personhood changed as well.  The public began to see
government approval of corporations—the tit-for-tat grant of power for a
specific purpose—as a vehicle for corruption.27  Many states began to
permit “free incorporation,” allowing individuals to create companies
(and gain protection from individual liability) with little more than proce-
dural controls from the state.28  From this evolved the key premise of real
entity theory: a corporation is its own distinct entity, and holds rights
independent of those granted to its owners and operators.29
20 Id. at 661–62.
21 Id. at 664–65.
22 For one perspective on the reasons for and consequences of this decision, see HART-
MAN, supra note 14, at 79–81. R
23 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
24 Id. at 168–70.
25 Id. at 177–80 (“The only rights [a corporation] can claim are the rights which are
given to it in [the charter], and not the rights which belong to its members as citizens of a
State.”) (quoting Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 519 (1839)).
26 Id. at 181.
27 See Schane, supra note 2, at 567 (“There developed an increasing mistrust in the R
efficacy of special charters granted by the state. . . . [T]hey led to corruption, political favorit-
ism, and monopolies.”).
28 Id. at 567–68.  Alternatively, some theorists suggest nineteenth century legislatures
enacted “permissive” corporate chartering laws because economic partnerships could become
de facto corporations using bilateral contracts. See Corporate Rights and Responsibilities,
supra note 14, at 11–12 (statement of Robert Hessen, Graduate School of Business and Hoo- R
ver Institution, Stanford University).
29 Schane, supra note 2, at 568. R
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An early example of this theory is Santa Clara County v. Southern
Pacific Railroad Company,30 in which the Supreme Court decreed that
the Fourteenth Amendment (specifically the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed to every person within the jurisdiction of the United States)
applied to corporations.31  That case involved a suit to recover unpaid
state taxes against railroad companies that believed the taxes were un-
constitutional.32  The railroads argued extensively in their briefs that
“[c]orporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”33  Before oral arguments on that case, Chief Justice Waite
said the Court wanted to hear no further arguments on that point; the
justices all believed the Equal Protection Clause applied.34
3. Aggregation Theory
One final alternate theory goes by many names; Professor Darrell
A.H. Miller refers to it as aggregation theory.35  The theory acknowl-
edges that corporations are separate entities, and that they can claim cer-
tain constitutional rights.36  However, they can only do so because the
individuals uniting under the corporate form can claim those rights.37  In
other words, denying a corporation Bill of Rights protections would deny
its shareholders, owners, or others those same protections.38  While nine-
teenth century jurists were aware of this theory,39 modern cases appear to
rely on it the most.  But as discussed later, courts are not as explicit or
clear as they should be when applying this theory.40
30 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
31 Id. at 396.
32 Id. at 403–04.
33 Id. at 396.
34 Id.
35 Miller, supra note 8, at 928–29. R
36 Id. at 930–31.
37 Id. at 928–29.
38 Id. at 929 (“A corporation does not have to exist, but if it does, the government cannot
condition its existence on the surrender of certain constitutional rights within its web of
contracts.”).
39 See Cty. of San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R., 13 F. 722, 743–44 (D. Cal. 1882) (“Private
corporations are, it is true, artificial persons, but . . . they consist of aggregations of individuals
united for some legitimate business. . . . It would be a most singular result if a constitutional
provision intended for the protection of every person against partial and discriminating legisla-
tion by the states, should cease to exert such protection the moment the person becomes a
member of a corporation.”).
40 For more complete discussions on these theories and their evolution, see Miller, supra
note 8, at 914–31; Schane, supra note 2, at 565–69; Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Imper- R
sonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 579–82 (1990); Emily
Carlton Cook, Note, How the Meaning of Incorporation Over Time Lends Support for Corpo-
rate Free Exercise Rights, 48 GA. L. REV. 1149, 1168–74 (2014).
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B. Bill of Rights Protections for Corporations
To some extent, corporations enjoy protections under the Bill of
Rights regardless of which theory a court chooses to apply.  Even artifi-
cial entity theory allows a corporation to possess one of these rights if its
charter reserves that right.41  Yet after Santa Clara County’s clear state-
ment on equal protection rights, the Supreme Court recognized Bill of
Rights protections for corporations in a variety of contexts.  Twenty
years after Santa Clara County, the Court recognized protections for cor-
porations against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment.42  The Supreme Court has recognized a right to trial by jury
for corporations under the Sixth Amendment43 and the Seventh Amend-
ment.44  The Court described freedom of the press as “a right to publish
‘without a license what formerly could be published only with one,’”
implying that this First Amendment protection actually extended a cor-
porate right to individuals.45
There are active debates about the limits of these rights. United
States v. White46 reaffirmed that corporations cannot withhold incrimi-
nating documents from valid court-ordered subpoenas and further recog-
nized that an individual acting on behalf of the corporation cannot claim
that same “purely personal” privilege.47  However, the opinion did not
clearly indicate what theory of corporate personhood it applied.  It noted
repeatedly that the privilege against self-incrimination is a “purely per-
sonal one” that cannot be used by a corporation, and attempted to apply
artificial entity theory in doing so.48  But the opinion appears to reach too
far; under Fifth Amendment doctrine, a person cannot claim the privilege
on behalf of a third person, which would create the same conclusion the
41 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 560–61 (1819).
42 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (deciding that a
corporation enjoys no protection against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, but
enjoys protection against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment).
The Court in Henkel appeared to apply aggregation theory in reaching its result:
[W]e do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled to
immunity, under the Fourth Amendment, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.  A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an as-
sumed name and with a distinct legal entity.  In organizing itself as a collective body
it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body.
Id.
43 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 76–77
(1908).
44 U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 532–33 (1970).
45 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).
46 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
47 Id. at 699.
48 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-3\CJP304.txt unknown Seq: 9  7-JUN-16 16:38
2016] CORPORATE “DEATH PENALTY” 705
court reached in this case.49  Even if one considered a corporation a per-
son, its officers could not claim self-incrimination protection for that
“third party” any more than an accountant (as an agent) could claim the
privilege for a client principal.50  It was thus unnecessary to consider
whether the protection was “personal” or “impersonal.”
First National Bank v. Bellotti51 found that all corporations have the
right to political expression under the First Amendment and the Four-
teenth Amendment, and seemed to rely on some form of aggregation
theory in doing so.52  However, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Com-
merce53 the Court held that a state statute limiting corporate expenditures
on political speech during a certain period was valid under a “compelling
government interest” exception, meaning that the First Amendment ap-
plied less strongly to corporations than to individuals.54  Writing in dis-
sent, Justice Scalia argued that the Court used a disfavored mode of
analysis: the artificial entity theory of persons.55  He claimed that the
restriction would harm the First Amendment rights of individuals solely
because they chose to join together under the corporate form.56
C. Citizens United
Justice Scalia had a chance to revisit First Amendment rights for
corporations twenty years later in Citizens United.57  In that case, a not-
for-profit corporation challenged a federal election statute forbidding
corporations and unions from spending corporate funds to advocate for
the election or defeat of a candidate within thirty days of a primary or
sixty days of a general election.58  The Court, after demanding the parties
file supplemental briefs “addressing whether [they] should overrule [Aus-
49 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see White, 322 U.S. at 704 (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 70 (1906); McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90, 90 (1906)).
50 See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973) (accountant made no
claim that he could avoid producing his client’s tax records using the Fifth Amendment, and
the Court denied taxpayer’s attempt to stop the accountant’s production of evidence as not part
of the “personal protections” of the amendment).
51 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
52 U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14
(“Certain ‘purely personal’ guarantees, such as the privilege against compulsory self-incrimi-
nation, are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the ‘historic function’
of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals.  Whether or not a
particular guarantee is ‘purely personal’ or is unavailable to corporations for some other reason
depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.”).
53 494 U.S. 652 (1989).
54 Id. at 659–60.
55 Id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s opinion says that political speech of
corporations can be regulated because ‘[s]tate law grants [them] special advantages’ . . . .”).
56 See id. at 684–85.  In fairness, Justice Scalia also argues that corporations themselves
have the right to speak, unwittingly invoking real entity theory in doing so. Id. at 694–95.
57 558 U.S. 310, 385 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
58 Id. at 320–21.
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tin],”59 returned to the standards used in Bellotti and Buckley v. Valeo.60
In other words, because the Court recognized in Bellotti that corporations
have free speech rights and in Buckley that restrictions on purchasing
political advertisements violate an individual’s First Amendment rights,
the Court decided that a restriction on corporate expenditures for political
advertisements is not valid.
It is difficult to identify which theory of corporate rights supported
the Court’s decision.61  The majority opinion appeared to rely on real
entity theory, holding that the identity of the “speaker” is irrelevant.62  In
rejecting arguments that compelling interests support these restrictions, it
focused on the rights of “all speakers,” including individuals, media
companies, and corporations.63  Yet it also acknowledged that, even if
the ban on these expenses were constitutional, “wealthy individuals and
unincorporated associations [could] spend unlimited amounts on inde-
pendent expenditures.”64  And though the opinion noted language in Bel-
lotti acknowledging that corporate speech could potentially create a
danger of corruption that individual speech would not,65 it dismissed it as
dicta, “supported only by a law review student comment, which misinter-
preted [court precedent].”66  Concurring, the Chief Justice also appeared
to accept real entity theory.67
Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, reiterated his reliance on aggrega-
tion theory.68  He wrote that the dissent “never shows why ‘the freedom
of speech’ that was the right of Englishmen did not include the freedom
to speak in association with other individuals, including association in
the corporate form.”69  Yet even his analysis rested on the premise that
59 Id. at 322.
60 Id. at 365; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1976) (overturning a law limiting an
individual’s ability to spend money in political campaigns, and stated that giving and spending
money in political campaigns is political speech for First Amendment purposes).
61 According to Padfield, the Court engaged in no corporate identity analysis at all, rely-
ing instead on the rights of the listener to hear corporate speech.  Padfield, supra note 12, at R
832–33.  This observation notwithstanding, the rest of his Article argues that theories of corpo-
rate identity are the key to understanding Citizens United. Id. at 833–34.
62 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364 (“The [First] Amendment does not permit Congress
to make . . . categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker.”).
63 See id. at 351 (“All speakers . . . use money amassed from the economic marketplace
to fund their speech.”); see also id. at 353–54 (“The Framers may have been unaware of
certain types of speakers or forms of communication, but that does not mean that those [speak-
ers] are entitled to less First Amendment protection than those types of speakers [that existed]
when the Bill of Rights was adopted.”).
64 Id. at 355–56.
65 Id. at 358 (citing First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788  n.26 (1978)).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 373 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“The First Amendment protects more than just
the individual on a soapbox and the lonely pamphleteer.”).
68 Id. at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring).
69 Id.
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the constitutional text “makes no distinction between types of speakers,”
drifting towards real entity theory.70
Justice Stevens and the three justices that joined his partial dissent
clearly relied on artificial entity theory.71  Justice Stevens stated that
while corporations contribute to society, “[they] are not actually mem-
bers of it,” and went so far as to declare it a “democratic duty” to “guard
against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending” in elec-
tions.72  He said that the Framers of the Constitution “took it as a given
that corporations could be comprehensively regulated in the service of
the public welfare.”73  Responding to criticisms from Justice Scalia, he
declared that no prominent Framer stated that corporate speech deserves
less protection than individual speech because “the contrary proposi-
tion—if not also the very notion of ‘corporate speech’—was inconceiv-
able.”74  His further analysis of cases since the founding relied on his
view that, because corporate spending carries a potentially corrupting
power and corporations are not people, such spending may be restricted
without violating the First Amendment.75  He finished with a flourish:
“Corporations . . . and their ‘personhood’ often serve as a useful legal
fiction.  But they are not themselves members of ‘We the People’ by
whom and for whom our Constitution was established.”76
Yet even this opinion swayed across different definitions of a corpo-
ration, at times applying all three.  For example, when discussing iden-
tity-based restrictions, Justice Stevens treated a corporation as if it were a
real person, in order to support the idea that identity-based restrictions on
speech can be valid in some circumstances.77  He then argued that, since
“corporations’ [First] Amendment speech and association interests are
derived largely from those of their members and of the public in receiv-
ing information,” corporate spending is “furthest from the core of politi-
cal expression.”78  Though Justice Stevens says this quotation supports
his use of artificial entity theory, it is clearly a direct application of ag-
gregation theory: it relies on a corporation deriving its rights and inter-
ests from those of its constituent members.  Thus, it appears that this (for
most purposes) dissenting opinion does not adequately consider whether
70 Id.; see also id. at 392–93 (“The [First] Amendment is written in terms of ‘speech,’
not speakers.  Its text offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker, from single
individuals to partnerships of individuals, to unincorporated associations of individuals, to in-
corporated associations of individuals . . . .”).
71 Id. at 395 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
72 Id. at 394.
73 Id. at 428.
74 Id. at 430–31.
75 See id. at 432–41.
76 Id. at 466.
77 See id. at 421–23 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
78 Id. at 423–24 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
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a corporation generally deserves Bill of Rights protections or not.  It is
instead a defense of one maxim: that corporate political spending is a
powerful corruptive force and should be regulated.
Currently, the proposition that the First Amendment protects corpo-
rate speech— including “speech” in the form of spending money to in-
fluence an election—stands.  It is not clear, however, why corporations
enjoy such protections.  By failing to consider the nature of a corpora-
tion, and whether the First Amendment protects the corporate “person”
or the individual citizens that comprise it, the Court invited a tidal wave
of criticism and rhetoric.79  The debate no longer focused on how to con-
trol money’s effect on politics; it now focused on whether corporations
are people.80
D. Hobby Lobby
This wave only strengthened when, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc.,81 the Court held that closely-held corporations could refuse
to provide coverage of certain methods of contraception based on the
religious beliefs of the company’s owners.82  In that case, the owners of
three closely-held for-profit corporations claimed that they ran their busi-
nesses according to Christian principles.83  As one of those beliefs is that
life begins at conception, the companies claimed that they were exempt
from provisions of the Affordable Care Act that required them to provide
coverage for contraceptives that may operate after the fertilization of an
egg.84  Forcing them to provide this coverage, they argued, would violate
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,85 as
well as RFRA.86
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito found that the corporations
were correct.87  At the outset, Alito appeared to use aggregation theory to
support his analysis.  Laws extending to corporations, he claimed, speci-
fied “the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders,
officers, and employees) who are associated with [the] corporation in one
79 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 4. R
80 See generally Ilya Shapiro & Caitlyn W. McCarthy, So What If Corporations Aren’t
People?, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 701, 702–03 (2011) (arguing that whether corporations are
persons  is “constitutionally irrelevant”).
81 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
82 See id. at 2759.
83 See id. at 2764, 2766.  Hobby Lobby’s statement of purpose, for example, stated that
the company should be operated “in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.” Id. at 2766.
84 Id. at 2764–65.
85 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion.”).
86 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb–4
(2012); see Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765–66.
87 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
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way or another.”88  The purpose of extending constitutional or statutory
rights to corporations, Alito states, “is to protect the rights of these peo-
ple. . . .  And protecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like [the
plaintiffs in this case] protects the religious liberty of the humans who
own and control those companies.”89  Thus, according to Justice Alito, it
is “quite beside the point” whether corporations exercise religion “sepa-
rate and apart from” their individual owners; a law burdening the free-
exercise rights of a corporation would burden the rights of a natural per-
son associated with the corporation.90
Despite accepting aggregation theory in principal, the rest of Justice
Alito’s opinion treated the corporations as if they were real entities.  For
example, he analyzed the impact of the mandate on “[the owners] and
their companies,” stating without clarification that the mandate “de-
mands that they engage in conduct that seriously violates their religious
beliefs.”91  In part, this occurred because the majority’s decision rested
on RFRA and not the Establishment Clause.92  Analyzing this statute re-
quires delving into a quagmire of issues—everything from the Dictionary
Act to issues of congressional intent—that interpreting corporate consti-
tutional rights does not require.93  These other issues may have influ-
enced Justice Alito’s decision to treat a corporation as if it is a natural
person in his analysis.
However, RFRA is an unusual statute: it attempted to restore broad
protections to religious beliefs previously recognized under the Constitu-
tion that a Supreme Court decision removed.94  The statute defines one
of its purposes as “to provide a claim or defense to persons whose relig-
ious exercise is substantially burdened by government.”95  And thanks to
the Dictionary Act, corporations count as persons absent evidence of
congressional intent to the contrary.96  According to Justice Alito, this
statute protects individuals who wish to incorporate their business; the
88 Id. at 2768.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 2775 (emphasis added).
92 See id. at 2785.
93 See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless
the context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals . . . .”); cf. Emily J. Barnet, Hobby Lobby and the Dictionary Act, 124 YALE L.J. F.
11, 11–14 (2014), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/hobby-lobby-and-the-dictionary-act (dis-
cussing how the Court may apply the Dictionary Act to the RFRA).
94 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
95 Id. § 2000bb(b)(2).
96 1 U.S.C. § 1.
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law cannot force them to violate their religious beliefs in order to enjoy
the benefits of operating as a corporation available to their competitors.97
As the majority decided the case using an application of RFRA, not
the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause as it applies to corpora-
tions,98 Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion primarily focused on the
statute instead of the Constitution.99  However, she used case law from
before RFRA and the case that inspired it to support her belief that the
Free Exercise Clause could not pertain to for-profit corporations.100  In
doing so, Justice Ginsburg clearly relied on artificial entity theory.  She
quoted Dartmouth College to support her own belief that “the exercise of
religion is characteristic of natural persons, not artificial legal enti-
ties.”101  But she ignored any impact the law may have on employers’
religious beliefs, declaring that the context of the law is different: she
saw the “relevant context” as “the employers’ asserted right to exercise
religion” against the rights of “employees who do not subscribe to their
employers’ religious beliefs.”102  Such an argument would be interesting
and relevant under aggregation theory: is it the rights of the owner or all
individuals associated with a corporation that the Constitution protects
when applied to a corporation, and what happens when associated per-
sons’ interests conflict?  But disappointingly, because she subscribes to
artificial entity theory, Justice Ginsburg did not pursue the point further.
Tellingly, only Justice Sotomayor joined the section of Justice Gins-
burg’s opinion discussing whether corporations could bring claims under
RFRA; Justices Breyer and Kagan found it unnecessary to decide this
point.103  Thus, while Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor clearly subscribe
to artificial entity theory, it is unclear what Justices Breyer and Kagan
believe.104
Though a consensus has started to emerge, the current Court cannot
agree on a theory of corporate personhood.  Some Justices, such as Gins-
burg and Sotomayor, still adhere to artificial entity theory.105  Some,
such as the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Thomas, may adhere
to real entity theory.106  Some, such as Justice Alito, follow aggregation
97 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767–68; see also id. at 2774–75 (discussing the difficulty
in determining religious beliefs of large publicly-traded corporations, and why it does not
apply where corporations are closely held).
98 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
99 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 2793–94.
101 Id. at 2794 (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819)).
102 Id. at 2796  n.17.
103 Id. at 2787, 2806.
104 While it does not necessarily reflect her personal beliefs, Justice Kagan was the Solici-
tor General cited in Citizens United.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 317 (2010).
105 See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
106 See supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text.
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theory.107  And some, such as Justices Breyer and Kagan, have not
clearly articulated their views in judicial opinions.108  Yet more often
than not, the Justices simply do not clearly articulate which theory they
prefer.
II. THE CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY
Extending the logic of these recent decisions (using either real entity
or aggregation theory), it is possible to imagine a world where corpora-
tions claim all Bill of Rights protections as their own.  If a corporation is
a person for the purposes of the law, why should the United States deny
it the most important protections its laws grant persons?  At the farthest
reaches of this chain of logic would be protection from the most severe
punishment United States law currently allows: the death penalty.  Given
the Justices’ current positions on corporate personhood, under what au-
thority could a state kill a corporation, and to what extent would the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment cur-
tail that authority?109
A. How to Kill a Corporation
As a preliminary matter, we must ask: how could a government kill
a corporation?  The most straightforward manner would be to revoke its
corporate charter.110  Professor Mary Kreiner Ramirez, for example,
thoroughly described a proposal based on the “nuclear option” of revok-
ing a corporate charter after three strikes.111  It is unlikely that any other
method proposed would actually result in a corporation’s end.  For exam-
107 See supra notes 68–70, 87–90 and accompanying text.  Justice Scalia, who supported
aggregation theory, died on February 13, 2016.  It is difficult to determine what theory current
nominee and D.C. Circuit Judge Merrick Garland prefers, but aggregation theory is most
likely.  He joined a unanimous opinion in 2010 that extended Citizens United’s logic to allow
unincorporated associations to spend without limit.  SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686,
692–93 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  But he also wrote the en banc opinion for Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d
1 (D.C. Cir. 2015), which upheld a ban on political campaign contributions by individual
government contractors.  Key to his analysis was that the statute at issue was closely drawn “to
avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.” See id. at 22–26.
108 See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
109 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
110 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 284 (West 2014) (granting Delaware Chancery
Courts the power to revoke a corporate charter “for abuse, misuse, or nonuse of its corporate
powers, privileges or franchises”).  Note that this death is not necessarily permanent; the char-
ter may be reinstated, and contracts created by this “dead” corporation may become operable
as soon as the entity is “revived.” DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 312; see ELIZABETH S. MILLER,
THE WALKING DEAD: FORFEITURES AND INVOLUNTARY TERMINATIONS OF FILING ENTITIES
(2015), http://www.baylor.edu/law/faculty/doc.php/196822.pdf.
111 See Kyle Noonan, Note, The Case for a Federal Corporate Charter Revocation Pen-
alty, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 627–28 (2012) (advocating for the replacement of the term
“divestiture” in federal sentencing guidelines with the term “charter revocation”); cf. Ramirez,
supra note 11, at 972–1001. R
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ple, suppose a court imposed a financial penalty that effectively ban-
krupted a corporation.  Gabriel Markoff, among others, calls this
corporate death penalty a “myth” and attempts to show that corporations
do not consider the risk of this “penalty” in negotiating “deferred prose-
cution agreements” with the Department of Justice.112  Additionally, the
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause may provide better protec-
tion against such a penalty than the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause.113  What if a court sent key directors or officers to prison, di-
rectly punishing those responsible for monitoring the company’s activi-
ties?  While this might severely damage a corporation, activist
shareholders regularly vote out entire boards without killing the entity
outright.114  Even banning a company from its main areas of business
would not necessarily kill it; the company could continue in some form
as an advisor or consultant.  Michael Milken, who “reinvented” junk
bonds at Drexel Burnham Lambert, continues to advise investment firms
despite agreeing to a ban from securities trading as part of a criminal plea
bargain.115  And the “Wolf of Wall Street” himself enjoys a second con-
sulting career.116  Thus, revoking a corporation’s charter seems like the
only solution.
Yet killing a company by revoking its charter is not just academic
speculation.  Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of
New York, carefully considers the risk of a regulator pulling a bank’s
charter should his office bring criminal charges, and has referred to such
a result as a corporate death penalty.117  And Senator Elizabeth Warren
directly requested that regulators shut down financial institutions for
criminal behavior.118  Indeed, many state corporation laws already permit
112 Markoff, supra note 10, at 797. R
113 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
114 See, e.g., Christopher Boyd & Lisa Baertlein, Darden Activist Ousts Olive Garden
Owner’s Full Board, REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/10/us-
darden-board-idUSKCN0HZ0U320141010.
115 See Edward Cohn, The Resurrection of Michael Milken, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
(Nov. 14, 2001), http://prospect.org/article/resurrection-michael-milken.  Regulators remain
uncertain whether Milken’s consulting work violates his ban. See also Scott Cendrowski &
James Bandler, The SEC Is Investigating Michael Milken, FORTUNE (Feb. 27, 2013), http://
fortune.com/2013/02/27/the-sec-is-investigating-michael-milken/.
116 Sheelah Kolhatkar, Jordan Belfort, the Real Wolf of Wall Street, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 7,
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-07/jordan-belfort-the-real-wolf-of-
wall-street.
117 Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Prepared Re-
marks at SIFMA’s Compliance and Legal Society Annual Seminar (Mar. 31, 2014) (transcript
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressspeeches/2014/SIFMARemarks2014.php).
118 See Jeff Connaughton, Regulatory Rockstar: Elizabeth Warren Is Using Her Senate
Seat to Grill Those Who Let the Big Banks Off the Hook, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 18, 2013), http:/
/www.newrepublic.com/article/112947/elizabeth-warren-senate-banking-committee-rockstar
(explaining that Senator Warren wanted this penalty applied to HSBC after they acknowledged
they laundered money for drug cartels, terrorists, and others).
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the revocation of a corporate charter because of felonious conduct.119
National banking charters may also be revoked if a bank’s directors
knowingly commit or allow employees to commit violations of the Na-
tional Banking Act.120  It is entirely conceivable that a legislature could
pass a criminal statute requiring the forfeiture of a corporate charter be-
cause of certain fundamentally unfair behavior.
B. The Death Penalty, Humans, and the Eighth Amendment
Yet to understand how the Eighth Amendment might protect corpo-
rations from a “death penalty,” one must understand how it protects
humans.  While the debate is not settled, current jurisprudence permits
the death penalty for humans under certain circumstances.  In Gregg v.
Georgia,121 the Supreme Court held that “the death penalty is not a form
of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circum-
stances of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and
regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose
it.”122  So long as the punishment does not “involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain” and is not “grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime,” the Court said such a punishment is permissible if
a legislature deems it necessary.123
Subsequent cases based on Eighth Amendment challenges to the
penalty mainly focused on procedural defects to its application.  For ex-
ample, the Court found that mandatory death penalty statutes violate the
Constitution.124  However, it has upheld schemes that separate the deci-
sions on guilt and on punishment and permit juries to weigh all aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors.125  By requiring that trials take into account
all relevant factors, the Supreme Court recognized the unique nature of
death as a punishment and attempted to create safeguards against a fun-
119 See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 11.301(a)(5) (West 2013) (permitting a court to
terminate a filing entity’s existence if the entity or its “high managerial agent” is convicted of a
felony, or to prevent future “felonious conduct”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1101(a)(2) (McKin-
ney 2014) (permitting revocation of the charter of a company that has “conducted or transacted
its business in a persistently fraudulent or illegal manner”).
120 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (2012); Larry J. Stein, Actions by National Bank Insiders that Can
Lead to Charter Revocation, 106 BANKING L.J. 472, 472 (1989).  Banks and corporations
generally are different concerns, as significant governmental interests in regulating currency
inflows and outflows complicate this question in the field of banking.  Even then, the Comp-
troller of the Currency rarely uses this severe penalty anymore, and must still gain judicial
approval before executing it.  Stein, supra note 120, at 473–74, 473 n.3. R
121 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
122 Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
123 Id. at 173.
124 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
125 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259–60 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 273–74 (1976).
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damentally irreversible harm.126  Those standards try to ensure that, even
when the punishment in question is the destruction of a person, the pun-
ishment fits the crime.127
III. STATE V. GLOBO BANK: A HYPOTHETICAL
While various states’ corporation laws might permit the revocation
of corporate charters for felonious conduct, challenges to these laws are
rare.128  In New York, for example, the most recent prominent case chal-
lenging a court order dissolving a corporation for fraudulent practices
was 1975’s State v. Cortelle Corp.129  While the challenge actually rested
on whether or not the action to dissolve the corporation was time barred,
the Court of Appeals of New York also discussed the origin of this
statute:
The State’s cause of action is for the abuse of power
entrusted to its creature, a corporate body.  In this sense,
apart from any possible wrong to individuals, it is also a
wrong against the State.  This wrong against the State
gave rise to the right of the State (or the sovereign) to
petition courts to amend corporate charters or dissolve
corporate existence.  It is both traceable back to English
common law and has continued into [New York law].130
There are two initial concerns about the court’s analysis.  First, this
would mean that a corporation that violates a sufficiently serious law
commits two crimes: the underlying act itself, and an “abuse of power
entrusted to [it]” by the state of New York.131  And second, the court’s
analysis rests squarely on the artificial entity theory of a corporation.
While the Supreme Court would grant the New York Court of Appeals’
interpretation of the statute deference, the statute must still comply with
federal constitutional law.132  In other words, dissolution of a corporate
charter under this provision is ripe for a challenge under the Eighth
Amendment.133
126 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate . . . legal
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”)).
127 For more on the death penalty and the Eighth Amendment as it applies to humans, see
generally Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth Amendment Regulation of the Capital-
Sentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 795–97 (1998).
128 See Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 869–70 (Tex. 2014) (discussing punishments
for “illegal” and “fraudulent” actions by corporations).
129 341 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1975).
130 Id. at 225–26.
131 See id. at 225.
132 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938).
133 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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A. The Case’s Background
Suppose that in 2015, reacting to numerous banking scandals over
the past five years and the growing threat of extremist groups to the fi-
nancial markets that New York State provides, the New York State As-
sembly amends its criminal code.  “Any corporation that provides
support for an act of terrorism,” the new law says, “must have its charter
permanently revoked under the procedures of New York Corporations
Law § 1101(a)(2).”  A few months after the law takes effect, the first
company faces this harsh penalty.  Globo Bank, a multinational financial
institution incorporated in New York State, provided a small business
loan for a small chemical company based in the Middle East.  The chem-
icals this company produced, as came to light at trial, were used in a
terrorist attack in the region that harmed New York citizens, among
others.134
Globo Bank argues at trial that it was unaware these chemicals
would be used in illegal acts, though it concedes that it knew the sub-
stances the chemical company wanted to research could cause great harm
if misused.  Unsympathetic, a jury finds the bank guilty.  Constrained by
the statute as written, the judge orders the bank’s charter revoked.135  All
appeals within New York State—including an argument that the penalty
is cruel and unusual punishment—prove fruitless.  As a last resort, Globo
Bank’s lawyers petition the Supreme Court to hear the case, arguing that
the statute procedurally and substantially violates the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  Miraculously,136 the
Supreme Court grants certiorari and hears the case.
B. The Court’s Analysis
Globo Bank’s strongest argument would be that the punishment is
not proportional to the crime.  The highest punishment the state can be-
stow on a corporation, the bank could argue, should not be applied auto-
matically, and not to a crime with such a low level of culpability.137
How the Supreme Court analyzes such an argument depends on which
theory of corporate personhood it chooses to apply.
134 For the purposes of this hypothetical, assume that Globo Bank was only charged under
N.Y. Corp. Law § 1101(a)(2), and actions such as rescission of a national banking charter do
not apply.
135 Most likely such a conviction, or even the chance of one, would start a run on the bank
resulting in its bankruptcy.  While not addressed here, this severe result outside the courtroom
could be one point in favor of finding such a penalty cruel and unusual.
136 The Court might grant certiorari as a result of the media attention the case would
surely attract, as well as the “chilling effect” other banks claimed this punishment had on loans
to small businesses in the United States and abroad.
137 To support its proportionality arguments, the bank could cite Miller v. Alabama, 132
S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).
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1. Artificial Entity Theory
Dissenting justices from Citizens United and Hobby Lobby138 would
continue to argue the traditional position: a corporate entity does not re-
ceive protection under the Bill of Rights.  The state granted Globo Bank
its powers and protections, they could argue, and may revoke those pro-
tections essentially at will.  Further, because the corporation has no body
that can be “punished,” they could argue, it cannot suffer the type of
punishment that this clause of the Eighth Amendment protects against.
This interpretation has the common law on its side.  Under early
English law, the sovereign could assert that a corporate body was
“‘guilty of an abuse of the power entrusted to [it]’ and seek its dissolu-
tion.”139  This power rested with whatever sovereign created the corpora-
tion.140  And committing a crime such as aiding terrorists could certainly
count as an abuse of entrusted power.
These justices would also argue that these corporations gain no pro-
tection from “cruel and unusual punishment” because they are not natural
persons.  A footnote in Bellotti suggested that certain constitutional
rights are “purely personal” and unavailable to corporations.141  Accord-
ing to that opinion, the “nature, history, and purpose of the particular
constitutional provision” determines if its protections are available to
corporations.142  As the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause focuses
on punishments to a person’s actual form and the Excessive Fines Clause
focuses on the forfeiture of money or property, Justices applying the arti-
ficial entity theory would point out that no natural person would lose
their life because of this provision.  At most, they would consider it a
taking of property, covered by the limits of the Excessive Fines Clause.
Thus, they would dismiss Globo Bank’s claims.143
There are two flaws in this position.  First, the “purely personal”
protections concept, which comes from an opinion denying a corporation
the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, is arguably based
138 Specifically, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310, 393 (2010).  Justices Kagan and Breyer may or may not accept this view, given their
reservations in Hobby Lobby. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2806
(2014).
139 State v. Cortelle Corp., 341 N.E.2d 223, 226 (N.Y. 1975).
140 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 664–65 (1819).
141 First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978).
142 Id.
143 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002)
(“The Eighth Amendment succinctly prohibits ‘[e]xcessive’ sanctions.”), with Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602, 609–10 (1993) (“The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is self-
evidently concerned with punishment.  The Excessive Fines Clause limits the government’s
power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, ‘as punishment for some offense.’”)
(internal citations omitted).
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on dicta.144  As noted above, the Court would have reached the same
result whether they treated the corporation as a constitutional person or
not, as an officer of the corporation could not claim the privilege on the
corporation’s behalf.  Second, scholars, legislatures, and judges all but
rejected the concept that a corporation’s authority comes from the state
alone in the late nineteenth century.145  Letting the state discriminate
against individuals in deciding who could incorporate for any given pur-
pose and who could not was in itself a vehicle for corruptive forces.146
Since then, most considered incorporation a free choice for a sole propri-
etor, subject to procedural restrictions from the state.  Nowadays, even
when business organization statutes permit states to revoke corporate
charters, such provisions abut prohibitions on using the corporate form
for a fraudulent purpose.147  It is highly unlikely that a state could dis-
solve a corporation formed for a legitimate lawful purpose that neverthe-
less negligently breaks the law simply because that state set out the
procedures required to form the corporation.
2. Real Entity Theory
If a corporation is a person for the purposes of the law, it deserves
the same protection granted to a person by the law.  Therefore, justices
that choose the real entity theory148 might apply the same test for cruel
and unusual punishment as against persons.  Under that test, the statute
would clearly fall.  First and foremost, the Court expressly forbid
mandatory sentences of death.149  As in Woodson, this statute does not
allow a judge or jury to consider mitigating factors, and is therefore un-
lawful.  Second, even if the statute let the jury weigh aggravating and
mitigating factors, it may find that corporate death is far too extreme
given the corporation’s conduct.  Globo Bank’s lapse in this case is ar-
guably one of judgment, not of character or intent.  Just as the death
penalty splits murders into degrees, the level of “aiding terrorists” neces-
sary for corporate dissolution may not pass this extreme mark.150  Jus-
tices applying the real entity theory would therefore likely strike the
statute down.
144 See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
146 See Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business Relationship in
the United States: Colonial Times to Present, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 553, 589–92 (1994).
147 See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1101(a) (McKinney 2014).
148 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Thomas have expressed their support
for this theory, though they may not continue to do so in the future. See Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010); id. at 373 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“The First Amendment
protects more than just the individual on a soapbox and the lonely pamphleteer.”); id. at 480
(Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
149 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976).
150 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002).
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One argument to the contrary is that the historical revulsion juries
showed to mandatory death sentences created this ban on automatic
death sentences.  “The history of mandatory death penalty statutes in the
United States,” the Court observed in Woodson, “reveals that the practice
of sentencing to death all persons convicted of a particular offense has
been rejected as unduly harsh and unworkably rigid.”151  That assertion,
clear from history in the case of natural persons, simply lacks authority
in the case of corporate persons.152
Another argument is the fault that many find in Citizens United and
Hobby Lobby: a corporation is not a person.  As noted time and again, it
has “no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked.”153  As Justice
Alito notes in his opinion in Hobby Lobby, “Corporations, ‘separate and
apart from’ the human beings who own, run, and are employed by them,
cannot do anything at all.”154  And while one can argue that the Framers
of the Constitution intended the Eighth Amendment’s protections to be
broad, the distinction between a real person and an entity that at its core
is a collection of contracts should be clear.  The death of a corporation by
dissolution of its corporate charter is obviously different in its impact
than taking the life of a human being.155  It is, at its core, the taking of
property.
3. Aggregation Theory
Aggregation theory156 would not examine whether revoking a cor-
poration’s charter would be a cruel and unusual punishment to the corpo-
ration itself.157  Instead, it would look to the actions of and impact on the
corporation’s human stakeholders—its directors, officers, employees,
shareholders, creditors, and others—and decide if the punishment would
be cruel and unusual to them.  Since under this theory the Bill of Rights
only protects corporations because it protects people, the relevant harm
must be the harm done to these persons.158  In the same sense that ban-
ning corporations from speaking (arguably) punishes individuals who de-
151 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 292–93.
152 Id. at 293; see also supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text (demonstrating clear
historical support for revoking corporate charters without the same “historical revulsion” to the
penalty).
153 John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (quoting Edward Thur-
low, First Baron Thurlow).
154 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
155 Nor, arguably, is it permanent.  Revoking Globo Bank’s New York charter would not
necessarily kill off its global branches, which could reincorporate in their respective home
countries or states.
156 Justice Alito explicitly supports aggregation theory. See supra note 107.
157 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767–68; Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 385–86
(2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
158 See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
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cide to incorporate, violating those persons’ First Amendment rights, this
statute would punish thousands of people for the criminal actions of a
few key individuals.  The theory raises difficult questions of criminal
law: who bears the burden of ensuring these loans do not fund terrorists?
Who is innocent and who is guilty within the corporation, and who
would punishing the corporation unfairly harm?  Why should employees
be out of their jobs because of the actions (or shortcomings) of as few as
one individual?
In one sense, this is the strongest argument against dissolving a
company using this penalty. And this is the most likely counterargument
to artificial entity theory; it was the key to Justice Scalia’s concurrence in
Citizens United,159 and played a fundamental role in the majority’s
Hobby Lobby opinion.160  It is also satisfying, from a populist standpoint,
to consider the harm done to workers and other stakeholders should the
corporation face dissolution.
But under this theory, the death penalty metaphor falls apart.  No
employee, investor, or director faces death under this statute; at best, they
face the loss of their property.161  The Court recognized that these tak-
ings of property are not cruel and unusual punishment, but could face
scrutiny as excessive fines.162  But this method of analysis would force
the Court to admit that the severity of the punishment that makes death
“different” for humans is inapplicable for corporations.
Nevertheless, given the level of conduct involved and the severe
harm to shareholders and creditors—not to mention the financial system
as a whole—Justices relying on this theory would likely find this punish-
ment arbitrary and capricious as applied.  Thus, they would find this spe-
cific statute violates the Eighth Amendment.
C. Disposition of the Case
Most likely, the Court would strike down this statute as applied on
two grounds.  First, the Court would find the mandatory sentencing re-
quirement unfair.  The statute would not permit juries to consider the
159 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 385–87 (Scalia, J., concurring).
160 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (“An established body of law specifies the rights and
obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated
with a corporation in one way or another.  When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are
extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people.”).
161 The average at-will employee faces less than that, as some courts have acknowledged
there is no property interest in at-will employment. See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d
46, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (noting that at-will government employees hold no property interest in
the position itself).
162 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609–10 (1993) (“The Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause is self-evidently concerned with punishment.  The Excessive Fines Clause
limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, ‘as punishment
for some offense.’”).
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harm dissolving the company would render onto corporate stakeholders,
nor mitigating circumstances the corporation or its shareholders, direc-
tors, and officers might provide.  While this clearly violates death pen-
alty jurisprudence for humans,163 which would convince those Justices
that apply real entity theory, aggregation theory would support this con-
clusion as well.  Mandatory minimum sentences must proportionately fit
the crime, and taking away a business from its stakeholders for a negli-
gent action seems far too harsh.164  Even those Justices applying artificial
entity theory might consider revoking the charter an excessive fine.165
Second, even if the mandatory sentence provision did not exist, a
majority of the Justices would likely find that dissolving the company for
essentially negligent action would be disproportionate.  Those Justices
applying real entity theory would note that almost every state statute im-
posing the death penalty requires an aggravated killing of a person.166
Even federal statutes only allow the death penalty in ten serious situa-
tions not involving murder, including treason; espionage; deaths result-
ing from aggravated activities such as hijacking, bank robbery, or civil
rights offenses; and deaths resulting from destruction of property “related
to foreign or interstate commerce.”167  Unwittingly funding the develop-
ment of materials used in a terrorist attack abroad does not rise to the
same severe level as these crimes.  Those applying aggregation theory
would apply a similar analysis.168  The minority of justices that would
apply artificial entity theory would find such a punishment acceptable.
Under this theory, New York could place any restriction it desires on the
entities it grants authority as corporations—including that this “contract”
is broken by negligently funding terrorism.169  Nevertheless, only a small
minority of Justices would accept this theory.
While it is unclear whether the Court would go further than this, it
may clarify that the punishment could be valid if amended.  All three
theories would allow it.  Artificial entity theory would permit it under
163 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976).
164 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983); see U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS-
TEM, app. E at 11–12 (2011), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-
testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Appendix_E.pdf.
165 Austin, 509 U.S. at 604 (noting that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment applies to forfeitures of property).
166 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
2012—STATISTICAL TABLES 5 tbl.1 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp12st.pdf.
167 Id. at 7 tbl.3.
168 While beyond the scope of this Note, punishment under this theory also implicates the
theories underlying corporate criminal liability, in itself a controversial topic. See, e.g., V.S.
Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1477, 1478 (1996) (exploring the purpose behind imposing corporate criminal liability for the
actions of employees, rather than individual liability).
169 See supra Part II.A.1.
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any circumstance; the state would retain the power to control the entities
it creates.  Real entity and aggregation theories would permit the statute,
provided the punishment fit the severity of the crime.  The standards
would be different.  Justices applying real entity theory strictly would
require it match the heightened level necessary for permanently destroy-
ing an entity.170  Those applying aggregation theory would merely re-
quire the crime committed justifies taking the property of investors,
employees, creditors, and other stakeholders.171  But both would agree:
under certain circumstances, revoking a corporate charter for criminal
actions could be entirely justified.
CONCLUSION
Critics of “corporate rights” treat opinions like Hobby Lobby and
Citizens United as evidence of a corrupt legal system and seek to amend
the Constitution to change the cases’ results.172  Politicians lose political
points (and even elections) for approaching the subject with anything less
than a ten-foot pole.173  In certain sections of public discourse, “corpora-
tions as people” is the worst sign of corruption in our government, and
the opinions that rely on this premise must by definition be incorrect.
This Note set out to explore the bounds of that conclusion by asking if a
corporation could claim a corporate right to protection against cruel and
unusual punishment.
It appears the answer is yes—but no more so than a human could.
Only a theory that assumes corporations carry no rights beyond what the
state grants them supports a contrary result.174  Such a theory would re-
quire individuals to give up their rights and protections under the Consti-
tution to gain corporate rights and protections like limited liability,
implicitly tying the approval of the state to creating a business.  And at
least since the late nineteenth century, corporate law in the United States
has not accepted this extreme position.175
To those that are unsatisfied with this result, perhaps the focus is on
the wrong parts of the opinions they disagree with. Instead of asking why
a corporation can speak as freely as a person, perhaps we should ask,
“Why is money considered speech?”  Instead of questioning whether a
corporation can hold a religious belief, perhaps we should criticize the
170 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002).
171 See supra notes 158–62 and accompanying text.
172 See MTA Coalition, MOVE TO AMEND, https://movetoamend.org/about-us (last visited
Nov. 24, 2015).
173 See, e.g., Philip Rucker, Mitt Romney Says ‘Corporations Are People,’ WASH. POST
(Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mitt-romney-says-corporations-are-
people/2011/08/11/gIQABwZ38I_story.html.
174 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
175 See supra Part II.A.2.
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breadth of a well-meaning protection of religious liberty that may extend
its reach too far.  “Corporations are people” (or “The Corporate Death
Penalty,” for that matter) is an eye-catching statement.  But perhaps it
hides issues that should be the focus of our discourse, distracting us from
the real questions.  Instead of asking what’s best for corporations and
what’s best for people, perhaps we should focus on what’s best for us.
